Here are some thoughts and questions on Kath Albury’s article...
I found the most shocking things in this article not to be revelations of kinky hairy sex, but rather casual omissions of facts like some people believe that sex should only be for procreation. Isn’t it shocking how many people such a simple statement excludes from the realms of ‘morality’ and condemns to the fires of hell? The same goes for the belief that masturbation is ‘immoral’. Mainstream porn and media is one thing, particularly in its one directional flow: certainly women are objectified and every second advertisement we see on TV is sexualised in some way, but we can’t just say “hey, I don’t think that sexy woman selling Cherry Ripes represents what I want to see in an ad for my favourite chocolate bar, so I’ll just make my own and put it on the TV, billboards and in magazines.” The internet, whilst not representing utopian possibility, allows for a more active involvement in what we consume, and if we so desire, produce and share. As we learnt, particularly from Jennicam, the internet poses tricky new (or new formulations of old) ethical problems. However, having read Kath Albury’s article, I find it hard to see how anyone, feminist, Marxist or otherwise, could be opposed to internet pornography. Anyone, that is, who is outside the blanket rules of morality. So- morals: in an age where people are racist, homophobic, sexist and condescending to people who enjoy a sexuality different to their own, should there be any place for morals? Do they facilitate othering? Or, like race, is it a concept we are idealistically better off without, considering we still have ethics?
“Of course, there are those who will argue that women in particular are not (and should not) consider themselves free to choose to enjoy pornography.” Who are these people? Are they extreme feminists like Andrea Dworkin who believe that women who participate in pornography are effectively prostitutes? Or simply people who believe that any representation of a woman’s sexuality, regardless of her wishes, is wrong because of the way that social trends have operated in the past? Are they the subscribers to Judeo-Christian morality? If a woman desires to participate in pornography, is it not anti-feminism for anyone to say that she should not, because of her gender?
Whether the ‘mainstream’ likes it or not, there are people out there who don’t have straightforward, heterosexual, procreative vaginal intercourse, and this is highlighted wonderfully in the article as people who had thought they were “the only one” find a community, and support if they need it. If sexuality is a private thing, should it not be a person’s private decision how they wish to express theirs, even if it is alone, homosexually or over the internet, as ‘kinkily’ as they like? What gives anybody the right to condemn another for their sexual preference, as long as it is not harming another? Does this bring us back to morals (again)?
[Long post in two sections]
ReplyDeleteI have four general points to make: about the "distinction" (note the scare quotes)between morality and ethics; the way morality may function outside traditional, Judeo-Christio-Islamic concepts; the difference between types of representations of sex; and about the difference between sex and porn. I will then attempt to answer some of the questions.
Firstly, the ethics-morality distinction. As I mentioned in the tutorial, this is not a distinction made within (philosophical) ethics. Why, then, is it being made? My guess is because of a misunderstanding of what morality (in the sense used by Foucault and Albury) is about. While for some, it is a case of "do this or go to hell," this is a melodramatic exaggeration of what theorists are trying to do. There are precious few "blanket rules" (Brittany), and few theorists "impos[e] from the outside, without regard for context, circumstance, or timing." (Albury) In fact, this is the type of thing that would serve as a criticism of a moral theory (eg Kantianism).
To give an illustration of the "blanket rules" that don't exist in modern moral theory, lets consider some ethical rules that have been put forward. A moral theory might say that one should not have an abortion. But it could, and has been objected that this would be unfair to eg 14-year old rape victims. So, the theory might say that one should not have an abortion unless the pregnancy is the result of rape. And it again may be objected that this leaves out cases where the pregnancy is unplanned, and will get in the way of other goods, eg a career. You can see where this is going – eventually arguments against abortion will become an all-other-things-being-equal affair, i.e., quite sensitive to context, circumstance, and timing.
This is not to say that morality isn’t in some sense “imposed from outside.” It is, in the sense that moral judgements apply to everybody, i.e. if something, ceteris paribus, is wrong, then it is wrong no matter who does it.
The relevance of this to the case of pornography is that certain communities of porn may be excluded from the judgement that “pornography is wrong” – i.e. they may be included in a ceteris paribus clause, or they may promote other goods that count against the badness of pornography.
My second point is more just me promoting an article by GEM Anscombe, called Modern Moral Philosophy. In it she argues that moral oughts are things that came from a broadly theistic worldview, and that in order to do moral philosophy we should drop these concepts. This article is considered to have led to the revival of virtue ethics. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051
Thirdly, the difference between types of representations of sex. It strikes me that the word "pornography" to talk about more that sexually explicit videos, pictures &c. For example, a movie with excessive gore might be called pornographic, as would a film that focuses on the lurid or sensational. So for representations of sex to be pornographic, it seems that those representations have to focus on the act in a certain way. There is probably a subjective element in this as well; probably the mainstream anxiety of porn comes from the assumption that sex cannot be represented but as sensational or lurid.
ReplyDeleteOne way that we could defend the morality of pornography (if I am permitted once again to use that concept) is to distinguish between lurid representations and other representations of sex. Certain pornographic communities (such as amateurs, I am not sold on fetishist communities (as they focus on the "abnormal" *as* abnormal)) might be able to represent sex in a way that does not sensationalise it. In doing so, they might be able to make pornography that does not objectify women &c.
Finally, between sex and porn. Sex is the act, and involves people. Porn is the end result, and involves images and video.
How does this answer the questions above? Let's see.
Firstly, I think morality is a useful concept. As it doesn't necessarily make blanket judgements, it doesn't necessarily marginalise groups. Also on this point I would mention that ethics (in the sense used by Albury) seems to require a notion of morality. A code of ethics, for example, that discourages image stealing erotic images, does so because the community considers this to be immoral (or harmful to the community, the user, or the health of the amateur scene, all of which can be considered synonymous with immoral).
On the second point and third points, we can consider the difference between sex and porn, and between different types of "porn" - i.e. sensationalist representations and non-sensationalist representations of sex. If the representation is sensationalist, then it does not matter what the sex itself is like. To condemn pornography is not to condemn the sexual preferences of those who consume or perfom it, it is to condemn the way the people in it are represented. Sex is private, porn is, in a sense, public.
Dayum Jay talk about TL;DR mate.
ReplyDeleteANYWAY I just wanted to say, Why aren't you in my tute! You had me at the title of your post D:
aw shucks ;)
ReplyDelete